

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5393

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

CINCPAC

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AMEMBASSY SAIGON

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 PHNOM PENH 3948

EXDIS

E.O.11652: XGDS

TAGS: PING

SUBJECT: THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IN CAMBODIA

1. SUMMARY. CORRUPTION IS A SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR THE GKR NOT BECAUSE THERE IS MORE OF IT HERE THAN IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES (THERE MAY BE LESS) BUT BECAUSE (A) THE WEALTH OF SOME CIVIL AND MILITARY LEADERS CONTRASTS GLARINGLY WITH THE SACRIFICES A BRUTAL WAR WAS IMPOSED ON OTHERS, AND (B) THE GKR'S HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE INCREASES SUSPICIONS THAT THIS WEALTH IS ILL-GAINED. THE ROOT CAUSE OF CORRUPTION IN THIS COUNTRY AS IN OTHERS AT A SIMILAR STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT IS FOUND IN THE HIGHLY PERSONALIZED, PATERNALISTIC STYLE OF LEADERSHIP, A CHARACTERISTIC NOT ONLY OF THOSE NOW IN POWER BUT OF ALL OF THOSE WHO WOULD REPLACE THEM. OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ARE ADDRESSING THIS PROBLEM BY HELPING TO CREATE NEW INSTITUTIONS AND MODES OF OPERATION AT THOSE POINTS IN THE SYSTEM WHERE EXTERNAL INPUTS ARE GREATEST, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FIELDS OF IMPORT CONTROLS, SOLDIERS PAY, PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT. BECAUSE OF THEIR EFFECTS ARE GRADUAL AND SELDOM DRAMATIC, THESE EFFORTS ESCAPE THE PERCEPTION OF THOSE WHOSE REACTIONS TO CORRUPTION CAUSE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. SYMPTOMATIC TREATMENT, EVEN IF ON OCCASION TEMPORARY OR ILLUSORY IN EFFECT, IS THEREFORE ALSO REQUIRED IF THE POLITICAL PROBLEM IS TO BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL.

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THE COUNTRY TEAM HAS WEIGHED THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF

SEVERAL "ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES" AVAILABLE TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. IT CONCLUDED THAT COOPERATION WITH A PARLIAMENTARY GROUP RECENTLY FORMED TO COMBAT CORRUPTION, STIFF PUNISHMENT FOR PROVEN OFFENDERS, TAXES ON LUXURY VILLAS AND AUTOMOBILES, AND THE REASSIGNMENT OF A NUMBER OF HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS WOULD AT THIS POINT SERVE THE LONG BORET GOVERNMENT BEST. END SUMMARY

THE BASIC PROBLEM

2. WESTERN JOURNALISTS AND NOT A FEW KHMER INTELLECTUALS TEND QUITE ERRONEOUSLY TO EQUATE CORRUPTION IN CAMBODIA WITH BEHAVIOR BEARING THAT NAME IN DEVELOPED SOCIETIES. IN FACT, CORRUPTION HERE IS NOT THE INFRACTION OF WIDELY ACCEPTED RULES OF IMPERSONAL BEHAVIOR WHICH CAN BE EASILY DEFINED, PERCEIVED AND PUNISHED BUT THE MAL-FUNCTIONING OF A PATERNALISTIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN WHICH ALL BUT A FEW EDUCATED ELITE UNCONSCIOUSLY PARTICIPATE AND WHICH CANNOT COPE WITH PROBLEMS OF THE MAGNITUDE NOW FACING CAMBODIA. SINCE QUANTIFYING EXCESSES AND DETERMINING CUT OFF POINTS IS NOT EASY, IT IS EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT TO PUNISH INDIVIDUALS WHO GLEAN TOO MUCH FROM DOING WHAT ALL OTHER LOYAL AND OPPSOTION LEADERS ARE DOING (AND TO SOME EXTENT MUST DO TO SURVIVE IN THE SYSTEM). EVEN WERE IT TO BE LEVIED IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT SUCH INDIVIDUAL PUNISHMENT WOULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO CHANGING THE SYSTEM.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN BEST CONTRIBUTE TO THE "FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION" IN CAMBODIA BY USING ITS INFLUENCE TO SUPPORT INSTITUTIONS AND NEW LEADERS WITH MORE MODERNIZED STANDARDS. WE HAVE BEEN DOING JUST THIS, BEGINNING QUITE NATURALLY WITH THOSE PARTS OF THE SYSTEM WHERE OUR MONETARY IMPUT IS GREATEST AND WHERE PATERNALISTIC METHODS CAN BE MOST HARMFUL:

A. WE REQUIRED THE GKR TO ABANDON IMPORT LICENSING WHICH HAD FOR YEARS BEEN A FOVORITE MEANS OF FEATHERING THE NESTS OF THOSE IN CONTROL OF THE LICENSING.

B. WE HAVE PUSHED THE GKR TO ESTABLISH A REALISTIC EXCHANGE RATE, WHICH WOULD CLOSE OFF AVENUES OF MANIPULATION FOR CORRUPT OFFICIALS.

C. WE HAVE GRADUALLY BEEN BUILDING UP AN AUDIT SYSTEM TOVERIFY IMPORTS. ABOUT 30 P/C OF ALL IMPORTS UNDER THE CIP ARE NOW COVERED BY AN END USE AUDIT PROGRAM, WHICH WILL BE FURTHER EXPANDED. AS CLOSE TO 75 P/C OF CAMBODIA'S IMPORTS

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ARE NOW FINANCED BY CIP, THIS PROGRAM ALREADY COVERS A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF IMPORTS AND LESSENS THE CHANCES OF MANIPULATION IN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE TRADE.

D. AT OUR SUGGESTION THE GKR IS ESTABLISHING A SEPARATE FOUNDATION FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT WITH STATUTES AND TOP PERSONNEL TO HELP PROMOTE MODERN MANAGERIAL PRACTICES, NOT NOW FOUND IN THE GOVERNMENT. THIS FOUNDATION WILL HOPEFULLY DEMONSTRATE THAT FOREIGN AID WILL GO TO THOSE ORGANIZATIONS

WHICH STRESS ACHIEVEMENT ABOVE POLITICAL OR PERSONAL TIES
AND THEREBY STIMULATE IMITATION ELSEWHERE.

E. WE HAVE PERSUADED THE GKR TO WITHDRAW FANK COMMANDERS' AUTHORITY TO PAY THEIR OWN TROOPS (AND TO PAD PAYROLLS WITH PHANTOMS) BY INSISTING ON THE CREATION OF A CENTRALLY CONTROLLED FINANCE CORPS WHOSE AGENTS NOW TRAVEL TO UNITS TO PAY EACH INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER. THE FIRST PHASE OF THIS PROGRAM MAY HAVE ELIMINATED AS MANY AS 80,000 PHANTOMS. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE PROGRAM, WHICH CONSISTS OF THE ISSUANCE OF SPECIAL NON-REPRODUCABLE PAY CARDS TO EACH INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER, WILL PROVIDE MORE POSITIVE CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY POPULATION. AS AN ADJUNCT TO THE FINANCE PROGRAM, THE FANK ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL ESTABLISHED IN LATE 1973 SEVERAL NEW PROGRAMS TO HELP ELIMINATE PHANTOMS. MORE POSITIVE CONTROL OF PERSONNEL IS BEING OBTAINED THROUGH A PERIODIC STRENGTH ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, THE TIME CONSUMING CODIFICATION OF A PERSONNEL DATA BANK, AND ISSUANCE OF DOG TAGS AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS. THESE MEASURES TOGETHER SHOULD REDUCE THE PROBLEM OF PHANTOMS TO NEGLIGIBLE PROPORTION.

F. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE HELPED INSTALL A NATIONAL CONSCRIPTION PROGRAM AND RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES WHICH SHOULD MAKE THE FORMATION OF SMALL PRIVATE ARMIES A THING OF THE PAST.

G. END ITEM UTILIZATION INSPECTIONS, THE CREATION OF A NEW AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, CLOSE MONITORING OF AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE RATES, THE CREATION OF NEW MACHINERY TO ASSURE THAT UNSERVICEABLE MATERIAL (BRASS IN PARTICULAR) IS TURNED IN, THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW SYSTEM OF SIGNATURE CARDS AUTHORITY FOR ISSUE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND PHARMACEUTICALS, AND INSPECTIONS OF THE RICE DISTRUBUTION PROGRAM HAVE ALL HELPED TO REDUCE CORRUPTIONISTS' ACCESS TO MILITARY SUPPLIES AND MATERIEL.

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EXDIS

THE BASIC PROBLEM

4. ALTHOUGH ENCOURAGING PROGRESS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MADE, IT IS NOT OF A NATURE TO BE PERCEIVED BY THE PEOPLE WHOSE REACTIONS TO CORRUPTION ARE CAUSING THE GKR POLITICAL PROBLEMS. FOREIGN JOURNALISTS ARE KEYED TO A MUCH SHORTER TIME FRAME AND SEE INJUSTICES WHICH "CRY OUT" FOR REMEDIES. THOSE KHMER OPPOSITION LEADERS WHO THEMSELVES OPERATE IN PERSONALISTIC MANNER SEE RIGHT AND WRONG WHOLLY IN TERMS OF PERSONALITIES AND BELIEVE CHANGING THE BOSSSES WILL CHANGE THE SITUATION. THOSE FEW KHMER WHO ARE OUTSIDE OR ON THE FRINGES OF THE SYSTEM TEND, LIKE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO PLACE LOCAL IMAGES OF POVERTY AND WEALTH AUTOMATICALLY INTO A WESTERN OR MARXIST CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, AND THEIR RESULTING PERCEPTION OF EVIL STIMULATES FAR MORE EMOTION THAN THOUGHT.

5. THE PROBLEM IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THESE FOREIGN AND SEMI-MODERNIZED KHMER OBSERVERS ARE AMONG THE MOST ACTIVE POLITICAL PARTICIPANTS ON THE CAMBODIAN SCENE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF TEACHERS, WHOSE SALARY DIFFERENTIAL (PERHAPS GRANTED ORIGINALLY IN COMPENSATION FOR THEIR LACK OF ACCESS TO THE EXTRA-LEGAL BENEFITS OF THE PATERNALISTIC SYSTEM) HAS BEEN DECIMATED BY INFLATION, ADDING PERSONAL INJURY TO A PERCEPTION OF WRONG TO OTHERS. THE STUDENTS, WHO HAVE FOR TWO DECADES PLAYED AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL ROLE IN COMBODIA, ARE IN A SIMILAR SITUATION. IN THE

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FUTURE, THESE ATTITUDES WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SPREAD AMONG THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF MILITARY LEADERS WHO, IF OUR PAY AND PERSONNEL REFORMS ARE ACCEPTED WILL FIND THEMSELVES AT LEAST PARTIALLY OUTSIDE THE PATERNALISTIC STRUCTURE.

POSSIBLE POLITICAL REMEDIES

6. SINCE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CHANGE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS' AND KHMER POLITICAL ACTIVISTS'S NEAR-SIGHTED PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM, EVIDENCE OF SHORT-TERM CHANGE, EVEN IF IT OCCASIONALLY PROVES TO BE FLEETING OR ILLUSORY, MUST BE PRODUCED TO KEEP THEM IN CHECK. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS EXAMINE THE PROS AND CONS OF SEVERAL CHOICES OPEN TO THE LONG BORET GOVERNMENT.

7. THE GOVERNMENT COULD SET UP SPECIAL ANTI-CORRUPTION MACHINERY (IN ADDITION TO THE NOW MORIBUND STATE INSPECTORATE) WHICH WOULD SOLICIT EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION FROM ALL SOURCES AND SEE THAT PERTINENT GOVERNMENTAL ARMS INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE. ALTHERRA-

TIVELY, THE MACHINERY COULD BE GIVEN ITS OWN INVESTIGATIVE ARM.

A. PROS. THIS WOULD GIVE CLEAR FOCUS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN AND WOULD PROVIDE AN OUTLET FOR THOSE WITH COMPLAINTS. CRITICS WOULD BE FORCED TO COME FORWARD WITH PROOF RATHER THAN RUMORS.

B. CONS. SUCH AN ORGAN IS LIKELY TO AROUSE EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS. IF ITS DIRECTORS ARE PART OF THE SYSTEM, THEY WILL PROTECT THEIR FRIENDS WITHIN IT AND HARASS THEIR ENEMIES. IF THEY ARE NOT PART OF THE SYSTEM, OBTAINING THE COOPERATION OF POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE DIFFICULT. IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO EXTEND THE JURISDICTION OF THIS ORGANIZATION TO THE MILITARY, WHO HAVE THE WAR COUNCIL FOR THIS FUNCTION, AND OMITTING THE MILITARY WOULD DESTROY THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT.

8. THE GOVERNMENT COULD ANNOUNCE ITS INTENTION TO COOPERATE WITH THE RECENTLY CREATED SPECIAL PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC'S HONOR, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO HELP ERADICATE CORRUPTION.

A. PROS. THIS COMMITTEE IS HEADED BY PERHAPS THE ONLY CREDIBLE FIGURE FOR SUCH A JOB, HIGHLY RESPECTED AND AUSTERE SENATE PRESIDENT SAUKHAM KHOY. SAUKHAM KHOY IS A DETERMINED MAN WITH FEW POLITICAL AMBITIONS, A REPUTATION FOR HONESTY AND NO REAL TIES TO GOVERNMENT CLIQUES. HE COULD BE EXPECTED

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TO PURSUE ALL LEADS. AS A LIEUTENANT GENERAL, HE PROBABLY COULD WIELD CONSIDERABLY MORE INFLUENCE IN FANK THAN A CABINET APPOINTED GROUP. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE HEAVILY CRITICIZED FOR THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THIS GROUP, WHICH WAS FORMED COMPLETELY ON THE PARLIAMENT'S INITIATIVE.

B. CONS. SAUKHAM KHOY'S FRONTAL AND NOT ALWAYS WELL THOUGHT-OUT ASSAULTS HAVE NOT ENDEARED HIM TO THE PRESIENT AND MANY MEMBERS OF THE PRESIENT'S PARTY IN PARLIAMENT, WHO HAVE REFUSED TO JOIN HIS COMMITTEE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FACT THAT HIS COMMITTEE, LIKE PARLIAMENT, IS TOTALLY SOCIO-REPUBLICAN WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH OTHER FACTIONS IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT AND PERHAPS EXACERBATE THE ALREADY WORRISOME CONFLICT OVER PARLIAMENT'S ROLE. MANY OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE JOINED SAUKHAM KHOY'S COMMITTEE ACCORDING TO ASSEMBLY VICE PRESIDENT APN SOTHI, WERE MOTIVATED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING AT THEIR ENEMIES; THIS ORGANIZATION THUS MIGHT ALSOBE ENVELOPED IN THE WEB OF PHNOM PENH'S PERSONALIZED POLITICS.

9. WHETHER OR NOT SPECIAL ANTI-CORRUPTION MACHINERY IS CREATED, THE GOVERNMENT COULD SEE THAT OFFENDERS CLEARLY CAUGHT IN THE ACT ARE GIVEN STIFF SENTENCES, INCLUDING DEATH, SUCH AS IN THE CASE OF THE MR-3 PAYMASTER MAJOR YIN KHENG.

PROS. THIS WOULD GIVE THE GENERAL PUBLIC GREATER

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EXDIS

CONFIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS IN FACT ATTEMPTING TO CURB
CORRUPTION AND SHOULD INHIBIT GROSS ABUSES.

CONS. IT IS VERYDOUBTFUL THAT ANY LEADERS OF
STATURE CAN BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL, CONVICTED AND PUNISHED. THE
PUNISHMENT OF ONLY MIDDLE GRADE OFFICERS CAN GIVE THE IMPRESSION
THAT ONLY HENCHMEN ARE GETTING THE AXE. IT HAS THUS FAR PROVED
DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT STIFF SENTENCES EVEN IN THE CASE OF
THESE MIDDLE GRADE OFFICERS (WITNESS THE ESCAPE OF YIN KHENG),
PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY HAVE RECEIVED AID FROM THEIR SUPERIORS.

10. THE GOVERNMENT COULD PERMIT OR ENCOURAGE PUBLICATION OF
CORRUPTION CHARGES. THIS WOULD ENTAIL A MUCH MORE LIBERAL PRESS
POLICY.

PROS. EXPOSURE IS A MUCH EASIRE PUNISHMENT TO INFILCT
ON MALEFACTORS THAN CRIMINAL SENTENCES UNDER THE EXISTING SLOW-
MOVING LEGAL SYSTEM. PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF CORRUPTION ALSO WOULD
HELP REFUTE OPPSOTIONISTS ELEMENTS AND FOREIGN PRESSMEN'S
CHARGES THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS COVERING UP MISCONDUCT.

CONS. IT HAS PROVED EXCEEDINTLY DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE
KHMER NEWS MEDIA FROM PERSONALIZED POLITICS, AND IT IS LIKELY
THAT MONEY WILL BE MADE BY PUBLISHING CHARGES AGAINST A PATRON'S
ENEMIES AND WITHHOLDING THOSE AGAINST HIS FRIENDS. NEWSPAPERS
ACCOUNTS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY EVENTUALLY ALSO GIVE AN EXAGGERATED
PICTURE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM. IN ANY EVENT, EX-

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POSRE IN THE VAGUE MANNER OF KHMER NEWS MEDIA IS UNLIKELY TO BE FOLLOWED UP BY LEGAL ACTION, AND EVENTUALLY PUBLIC CONFIDENCE COULD BE UNDERMINED BY THE CAMPAIGN.

11. THE GOVERNMENT COULD REQUIRE OWNERS OF VILLAS, EXPENSIVE CARS AND OTHER VISIBLE SIGNS OF WEALTH TO DOCUMENT THE SOURCE OF IMCOME SPENT ON SUCH ITEMS.

PROS. THIS HITS AT THE MANIFESTATIONS OF WEALTH, WHICH IS THE BASIC POLITICAL PROBLEM, AND SHOULD DECREASE FUTURE EXPENDITURES ON SUCH ITEMS.

CONS. THERE ARE MANY LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH REQUIRING PEOPLE TO PROVE THEIR INNOCENCE WITHOUT PRODUCING ANY EVIDENCE OF GUILT. THERE WOULD BE A PROBLEM IN FINDING A GOVERNMENT OFFICE WHICH COULD HANDLE THIS OPERATION DISINTERESTEDLY. VIRTUALLY EVERY KHMER LEADER OF ANY STATURE AT ALL HAS AT LEAST ONE EXPENSIVE VILLA AND PROBABLY FEW OF THEM COULD DOCUMENT THE SOURCE OF THE MONEY SPENT FOR THEM. THIS EXERCISE WOULD IN ANY EVENT TAKE US BACK INTO THE SIHANOUK ERA AND THUS MAGNIFY THE TASK MANY-FOLD. FINALLY, MONEY NOW SPENT ON LOCAL CONSTRUCTION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY GO INTO CAPITAL FLIGHTS.

12. THE GOVERNMENT COULD PLACE A HEAVY TAXES ON VILLAS, CARS AND OTHER VISIBLE SIGNS OF WEALTH.

PROS. THIS WOULD HIT (BUT MUCH LESS HEAVILY THAN ALTERNATIVE IN PARA 9 ABOVE) MANIFESTATIONS OF WEALTH, WHICH ARE THE ROOT OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEM AND INHIBIT FUTURE EXPENDITURES OF THIS KIND. IT COULD PRODUCE BADLY NEEDED REVENUE FOR THE GOVERNMENT.

CONS. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE GKR NOW HAS GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY WHICH COULD LEVY AND COLLECT EQUITABLE TAXES OF THIS SORT. THIS COULD ALSO STIMULATE CAPITAL FLIGHTS, BUT TO A LESSER DEGREE THAN THE OPTION DESCRIBED IN PARA 9.

13. THE GOVERNMENT AND FANK COULD TRANSFER OFFICIALS MOST RUMORED TO BE CORRUPT TO POSITIONS FROM WHICH THEY CAN DO LESS HARM, IN THE CASE OF THE MORE PROMINENT LEADERS, TO EMBASSIES ABROAD.

PROS. THIS WOULD AVOID ENGAGING THE VERY CUMBERSOME AND POROUS KHMER LEGAL SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH SUCH PUNISHMENT IS LIGHT, KHMER ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO CHANGES IN STATUS AND WOULD GET THE WORD. THE NATURE OF THE PATERNALISTIC SYSTEM WOULD ENSURE THAT MANY OTHERS CONNECTED WITH THE TRANSFERRED OFFICIALS

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ARE ALSO REMOVED FROM POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE. MOST IMPORTANT,

PERHAPS, THESE TRANSFERS WOULD MAKE ROOM FOR MORE CAPABLE LESS PATERNALISTIC PEOPLE AT THE TOP.

CONS. MUCH PRESSURE WILL BE NECESSARY TO REMOVE SOME OF THE WORST OFFENDERS, INCLUDING STRONG DEMARCHE TO THE PRESIDENT. FINDING CAPABLE PEOPLE TO REPLACE THESE LEADERS WILL NOT ALWAYS BE EASY. REMOVING PIECES FROM AN INTRICATE PERSONALIZED STRUCTURE WILL CAUSE STRESSES THE RESULT OF WHICH WE CAONNOT ALWAYS ACCURATELY PREDICT.

CONCLSIUNS

14. OF ALL THE ALTERNATIVES OUTLINED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE THOSE IN PARAS 8, 9, 12 AND 13 ARE ALONE SUITABLE FOR THIS PARTICULAR TIME. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE BORET GOVERNMENT IS ALREADY PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO TAX VILLAS AND LUXURY CARS.) WE ENVISAGE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ON OUR PART TO HELP MOVE THE GOVERNMENT IN THE DESIRED DIRECTION:

A. WE WILL SUGGEST THAT BORET PUBLICLY ANNOUNCE HIS GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH SAUKHAM KHOY'S COMMITTEE AND EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT CITIZENS HAVING COMPLAINTS WILL ALSO COOPERATE BY FULLY DOCUMENTING CHARGES AGAINST CORRUPTIONISTS AND PRESENTING THEM TO SAUKHAM KHOY'S COMMITTEE. THE ACTUAL WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GKR AND THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE MUST BE WORKED OUT GRADUALLY AND CAUTIOUSLY AS SAUKHAM KHOY'S INTENTIONS AND WORKING METHODS BECOME CLEARER.

B. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE MILITARY TO METE OUT STIFF PUNISHMENT TO CORRUPT (AND COWARDLY) COMMANDERS AND WILL URGE CIVIL AUTHORITIES TO PURSUE MOREFORCEFULLY AND PUBLICIZE MORE FULLY THE PUNISHMENT OF THE MANY CIVIL EMBEZZLERS AND TRAFFICKERS WITH THE ENEMY.

C. WE WILL RECOMMEND THAT THE GOVERNMENT BRING IN FOREIGN TAX EXPERTS TO DRAW UP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE METHOD OF DETERMINING AND COLLECTIONG TAXES ON VILLAS, LUXURY CARS, ETC. THESE EXPERTS, WHO WE HOPE WOULD REMAIN TO OVERSEE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM, COULD HELP ISOLATE THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE POLITICAL PRESSURES THAT ARE BOUND TO ARISE.

D. WE SHALL VERY DISCREETLY AND GRADUALLY PUT FORWARD OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PERSONNEL CHANGES. IN MANY IF NOT MOST INSTANCES THESE CAN BE JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF HEALTH OR THE NATUAL NEED FOR REST AFTER VERY LONG PERIODS OF

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BURDENOME RESPONSIBILITIES. WE HOPE THAT FANK WILL ALSO MOVE AT THIS TIME TO "A TOUR OF DUTY" POLICY FOR GENERAL OFFICERS, WHICH COULD, OF COURSE, BE ADVERTISED AS PART OF THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IT NOW IS IMPLEMENTING.

ENDERS

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